ON Voting Systems/Schemes __
On_Other_Stuff
This is presented as true to the best recollection and is offered
for guidance with NO warranty expressed or implied.
Your mileage may vary.
There are several facets to the total voting process ...
.. Registering
.. Obtaining a Ballot
.. Voting that Ballot
.. Counting all of the Ballots
.. RE-Counting the Ballots, as may be necessary
All of these are fraught with problems ...
.. Registering -
Seemingly anyone can register anyone or anything to vote,
even illegal immigrants, pets, and plants.
.. Obtaining a Ballot -
Seemingly anyone can appear at a polling place and present themselves as anyone
who may be listed on the registration rolls.
.. Voting that Ballot -
Seemingly some voters have trouble marking/punching their ballots
.. Counting all of the Ballots -
Some ballots can be destroyed by the counting process
Some ballots can be overlooked by clerical processing errors
Some ballots can be changed or voided by handling processes --
whether accidently or intentionally
Some electronic copies could be easily lost, damaged, or hacked.
.. RE-Counting the Ballots, as may be necessary -
Some ballots can be hard to re-read by machine or by hand.
In case of single copies, there may be NOTHING available to RE-count.
All of these facets and problems need to be carefully and completely addressed
in order to secure the greatest possible integrity to all total voting processes.
ALL of the fears related to the following quote need to be quelled prudently -
"It is enough that the people know there was an election.
The people who cast the votes decide nothing.
The people who count the votes decide everything." --Josef Stalin
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A Best-of-All-Worlds Voting System/Scheme for Voting, Counting and RE-counting ____
Basic features are Rundancy, Human Readability,
Auditability, Hacker Proof, with NO Traceability.
Signing-In
When a voter signs-in, instead of the traditional ballot of one
kind or another, they will be given a one-time-use card key
which has been encoded with the precinct number and
a unique, non-sequential random number which canNOT be
traced to the specific voter.
Together these will constitute an id number.
Uniquely identified cards and numbers would need to be used
if the voter's qualifications are in doubt.
Activating the voting unit --
This card key will be inserted in the voting unit to activate it.
Selecting and Proof Reading ...
. Voter uses touchscreen or other means to select desired
ballot spots.
. Voter can skip ahead or go back in sequence at any time
to review their work.
. When the voter is finished voting and reviewing,
then they press "PRINT".
. The voting unit will print TWO(2) copies of the filled-in ballot.
. BOTH copies will be identical; each copy will include a
machine and a human readable copy of the result, the id
number, and the date/time.
. If the voter is DISsatisfied with the result as they read it,
then they may still alter their vote and print it again
UNTIL they get it right.
Finalizing -
. When the voter is finally satisfied with the results, then they
will remove the id card which will record the latest vote in the
unit electronically.
. They will then return the id card and ONE(1) of the printed
ballots of their final result to the precinct worker who will
file each item type in separate containers.
. The other copy (or copies) are to be taken away by the voter
and either destroyed or kept for reference.
At this point there are 3 or 4 copies of the voter's results..
. electronically recorded in the system
. filled-in on the printed paper ballot
(possibly as mark sense format AND in Intacta format)
. retained in the voter's copy of their ballot,
essentially as a receipt.
After the polls close at the end of the day, then each unit's results
will be transferred to some external memory (e.g., memory stick,
3.5-inch floppy) for transferring to a regional counting center.
The boxes of deposited ballots and used id cards will be opened
and counted. The counts for each should be equal and
also equal to the number of signed-in voters.
The regional counting center will process the externalized data
and place the totalized results on the center's InterNet WebSite,
together with the individual detailed ballot data by id number.
The only link between the voter and the id number will be the copy
of the ballot that the voter kept as a receipt.
This provides auditability BY THE VOTER
withOUT Tracability TO THE VOTER.
BOTH the used and the unused id cards will be returned separately
and tabulated to account for ALL of the cards and to correlate the
voting data to only the used cards.
REDUNDANCY and AUDITABILITY --
If anything goes awry with the electronic record,
then the paper ballot can be read by a machine.
If anything goes awry with the machine's reading of the paper ballot,
then it can be read by a human.
The voter may logon to the internet and enter the id number from
their copy of their ballot and see for themselves the way that
their vote has been recorded by the system.
If somehow any id card gets reused, then the counting center's
system will catch the duplicated id number.
and the one with the
earliest time-stamp will be accepted
If the corresponding paper ballot is available, then the
electronic data which matches the time-stamp of the paper
ballot will be accepted.
If the corresponding paper ballot is unavailable, then the
electronic data with the earliest time-stamp will be accepted.
(possibly the unit could cancel the card by recording a "used"
field directly on the card)
If somehow any voter places two paper ballots in the
container, then the counting center's system will catch
the duplicated id number.
If there is corresponding electronic data available,
then the paper ballot which matches the time-stamp of the
electronic will be accepted.
If the electronic data is unavailable, then the one with the
earliest time-stamp will be accepted.
If somehow an id card gets counterfitted and used, then the
counting center's system will catch the fact that the
number, is not one of those issued to that precinct.
If somehow an id card gets counterfitted and used, with a number
which is valid for that precinct, then the procedure for a
reused id card should be followed.
VOTER CONFIDENCE/TRUST -
(this is BIG concern with whiz-bang electronics and abounding hackers)
With the voters having a copy that they can check online,
and knowing that a machine- and human-readable copy is
secure in addition to the primary electronic copy,
they should have much greater confidence in and much less suspicion
about the tallying of the results -- as technology assists in
the process but is not the only thing upon which the results
are totally dependent.
PRINTED BALLOT FORMAT ...............
The printed ballot should be in a form which can be read easily
by the voter for proofing and validating and also by a machine.
The format for the voter should resemble the sample ballot that
they were given and likely took to the polling place.
The format for the machine might be either ...
(a) optically scanable in OCR format
(b) optically scanable in ScanTron format
(c) optically scanable in an encoded format like that developed by
Intacta Technology; see at site .. www.intacta.com
This could include error and/or tampering detection
via parity, redundancy, and/or simple check-sum schemes.
If (a) or (b) were used, then the format would likely also be
sufficient for the voters' reading.
If (c) was used, then the vote would be more secure (i.e., less
able to be counterfeited) and could be placed in multiple
locations on the page (e.g., opposite corners) to avoid problems
with its possibly being corrupted at any single location.
If (c) was used together with either (a) or (b), then the
combination would give added protection against non-readability.